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Abstract
A number of studies show that there is a link between social comparison and high
levels of household debt. However, the exact mechanisms behind this link are not
yet well understood. In this paper, we perform a lab experiment designed to study
the e↵ects of social image concerns and peer information on consumption choices
that can be financed through debt taking. We find that having to announce one’s
consumption decision publicly leads to leaving money on the table, which is the
opposite of what we expected. Being informed about other participants’ choices
leads to conformity in choices between participants.
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1 Introduction
The number of over-indebted households is increasing worldwide (IMF, 2017). In Ger-
many, for example, 6.9 million households were regarded as over-indebted (Creditreform
Wirtschaftsforschung, 2017) and 7.5% of German households had negative assets in 2017
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2019). These high levels of debt cannot be rationalized by con-
ventional economic theory and, in this regard, households’ borrowing behavior is vastly
understudied. There are many open questions about the determinants of debt taking (Zin-
man, 2015). Despite this, household debt is a wide ranging problem, as over-indebtedness
can pose a serious risk to household well-being and the economy as a whole (IMF, 2017).
One promising, but still very small, line of research studies the e↵ects of social com-
parison and peer e↵ects on debt levels. Georgarakos et al. (2014) find that individuals
who believe their social circle to have higher income than themselves are more likely to
hold debt. Agarwal et al. (2018) show, using lottery winners in Canada as exogenous
variation, that unequal incomes in neighborhoods can lead to financial distress. These
studies find evidence for the e↵ect of social comparison on debt. However, what remains
unclear are the mechanisms behind these e↵ects. In this paper, we aim to shed light onto
these mechanisms by performing a lab experiment in which we are able to disentangle
two di↵erent channels.
We use three di↵erent treatments to disentangle the following two possible drivers:
social image concerns, concerns about private information about oneself that is revealed
to others, and peer information, the information about others that is revealed to oneself.
Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) clearly distinguish between these two kinds of peer e↵ects.
By separating these two mechanisms, we also contribute to literature on peer e↵ects in
general.
The three treatments vary the way participants make and communicate a consump-
tion decision: participants are supposed to buy one pen out of a set of di↵erent quality
pens with money they have previously earned in an IQ-quiz. The amount earned depends
on how participants perform in comparison to the others in the session. All the money
not spent is lost. Thus, assuming cognitive ability to be a socially desirable trait, the
consumption decision can be indicative of being a “lower” or a “higher” type. In the con-
trol treatment, the decision which pen the individual participant buys is kept private. In
contrast, in the public treatment, each participant must announce their decision publicly.
The decision of which pen to buy is made in private before the public announcement,
but participants know about the announcement before they decide. In the information
treatment, the consumption decisions of participants who made their decision previously
is shown to the participants on screen before they make their own decision. This way,
participants are informed about the decision of others without identities being revealed.
1
In all treatments, participants have the possibility to take out a loan to buy a higher
quality pen. They can later repay this loan by exerting su cient e↵ort in a real-e↵ort
task (the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012)) or by using their participation fee. To es-
timate not only between treatment e↵ects but also the possible shift in preferences within
participants, we elicit a non-manipulated consumption preference prior to the experiment
by conducting an online survey and compare it to the decision in the experiment. Fur-
thermore, we elicit a comprehensive list of character traits and interact these traits with
our treatments to investigate who is susceptible to social comparison.
We have two main expectations regarding the outcome of our experiment. First, loan
take-up in the public treatment is higher than in the control treatment, since “lower”
types try to hide their type by buying a more expensive pen as a way to signal high IQ.
Second, take-up is also expected to be higher in the information treatment than in the
control, because of a preference for conformity or because new information is received by
learning about other participants choices. However, we expect this e↵ect to be smaller
than the social image e↵ect in the public treatment, because it could potentially also move
in the opposite direction. Related to these hypotheses, we generally expect persons who
take a loan to work harder in the slider task.
Our results are very surprising. Participants in the public treatment do not take more
loans than those in the control treatment, but are more likely to buy a pen of lower
quality than they could actually a↵ord. Two likely explanations for this finding are that
(i) they do not want to be perceived as smarter than their peers, as it might not be
socially desirable; and/or (ii) they do not want to be publicly blamed for making other
participants worse o↵ as their “success” in the experiment is directly linked to the “failure”
of others. Thus, they still exhibit social image concerns but of a di↵erent kind than we
hypothesized. We expected social image concerns to coincide with social status concerns in
our experiment but clearly have to refute this expectation. In the information treatment,
we find strong evidence for a taste for conformity. Lower performing participants do
take out slightly more loans while higher performing participants buy a lower quality pen
than participants in the control group. This means that participants in the information
treatment converge to some average quality pen although adjustment from above is much
larger than from below.
These results are supported when comparing pre-experiment preference to actual
choice in the experiment: looking at the e↵ects of our treatments within subjects, we
can see that participants in the public treatment buy more lower quality pens, whilst
participants in the information treatment adjust their choices to match those who have
chosen before them, which is not the case for participants in the control treatment. Sur-
prisingly, the amount of loan taken is negatively related to performance in the slider task
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for all treatments, even when controlling for general ability and motivation. This means
participants do not want to make up for the lost earnings with extra work.
Beyond helping to broaden out knowledge about why private debt might have increased
sharply worldwide, our study is linked to at least two other strands of the literature. First,
to the literature on peer e↵ects on consumption decisions in general and through which
channels these e↵ects actually might be induced. Second, on the discussion started by
Veblen (1899) over 100 years ago on who is actually engaging in conspicuous consumption
and is even willing to take out a loan to finance it.
Several studies find that social comparison at least influences consumption decisions.
In the field, Kuhn et al. (2011) find that the likelihood of buying a new car increases if
someone in the neighborhood has recently bought a new car (see also Grinblatt et al.,
2008). Rural villagers make consumption decisions that are more in line with the decisions
of those that they observe (Grohmann and Sakha, 2019). In the lab, people are less likely
to take up additional assistance when this has to be done publicly to compensate for a
smaller payout due to low cognitive ability (Friedrichsen et al., 2018). Methodologically,
the experiment by Clingingsmith and Sheremeta (2017) is closely related to ours. They
show in the lab that participants increase consumption of a “luxurious” good if income
is linked to a desirable trait and the decision has to be made publicly. Our experimental
design resembles theirs. However, we explicitly look at taking out a debt to consume and
we have an additional treatment to test for peer information e↵ects.
As previously noted, concerning debt taking and peer e↵ects, we find only a few
studies looking explicitly at this relationship. Bertrand and Morse (2016), describe, in
their appendix, how the presence of higher top-income households is probably causally
related to higher credit and bankruptcy in low-income households. As mentioned before,
Georgarakos et al. (2014) find a link between beliefs on the a✏uence of the own social
circle and debt taking. Agarwal et al. (2018) show that having a lottery winner in the
neighborhood leads to increased rates of bankruptcy for others in the area. While the
former studies depict correlations, the latter does not discusses through which personal
channels peer e↵ects work and who is more responsive to social comparison.
Many of the aforementioned field studies implicitly explain higher “visible” consump-
tion merely as a result of conspicuous consumption. In reality it is hard to disentan-
gle whether persons want to convey status with their visible consumption or they just
“learned” from the visible consumption of others and want to conform. There is a sub-
stantial literature on how social -peer- information a↵ects pro-social behavior and chari-
table giving (e.g Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2009; Smith et al., 2015) but
less so on (debt-financed) consumption.
We see two major contributions of this lab experiment. First, we are able to study
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the mechanisms behind an e↵ect that is found in a number of studies based on field
experiments. Second, we test if e↵ects, such as the social comparison e↵ect that holds in
studies on consumption, also hold once consumption can be financed through debt.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the experimental design and the
data we collect. Section 3 reports our main results and Section 4 presents robustness
checks. Section 5 discusses our findings in more detail while Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Our experiment is designed to mimic consumption decisions in social situations when
credit is available. The treatments vary in how the consumption decisions are made.
There are three main stages to our experiment. A schematic description of the di↵erent
stages is shown in Figure 1.
Instruct.
Intelligence
Test
Consumption
Choice
Treatment
Slider
Task
Questionnaire Payout
Figure 1: Experimental Flow
Once in the lab, participants first read the instructions and enter an individually
constructed ID on the computer. Instructions are given in written form and on screen (see
Online Appendix III.I). Then, the participants have to answer comprehension questions
on the screen regarding the procedure of the experiment and payo↵ possibilities (see
Online Appendix III.II). If there are participants who have made mistakes in this part,
the experiment only continues after one of the experimenters explains the right answer to
these persons.
2.1 Intelligence Test
Following the instructions and comprehension questions, participants take an IQ-style
test, for which they are paid according to their performance in relation to others in the
session. All questions are taken o↵ a website endorsed by Mensa and designed by a member
of Mensa. Participants are made aware that these type of questions are used to measure
intelligence. The questions are not designed to give a reliable IQ measure but present
small intelligence riddles with varying levels of di culty. We include questions for several
levels of di culty as defined by the website. Our test consists of twelve questions: four
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questions on completing number sequences and eight questions on completing sequences
of pictures with geometric forms (see Online Appendix III.III). Participants have seven
minutes to answer as many questions as possible. An intelligence test is chosen by us
because we believe it is intrinsically desirable for our student sample to perform well on
it. The top performing quartile in each session is paid 3e, the third is paid 2e, the second
is paid 1e and the bottom quartile is paid 50 Cents.
The test has an adequate level of di culty. Out of the twelve questions the best
candidates answered nine questions correctly and the worst none. The average candidate
gave 4.43 correct answers and, with a standard deviation of 2.14, there is a good spread
in the number of questions answered correctly.
2.2 Consumption Choice
The quiz is followed by a “shopping round,” in which participants can buy a pen with
the money they just earned. The pen is available in 5 di↵erent qualities and we use a star
rating to convey the di↵erence in quality: the five-star pen costs 4e, the four-star 3e, the
three-star 2e, the two-star 1e, and the one-star pen costs 50 Cents. Thus, there is a pen
quality for each earnings level and one pen whose price exceeds maximum quiz earnings.
A picture of the pens and their labels is placed by each computer at the beginning of
the session (see Online Appendix III.IV). The lab prices present the actual list prices of
the pens that are all from the same brand. The labeling makes it clear that the more
expensive pens are supposed to be more desirable than the cheaper ones. To buy a pen
that costs more than what participants earned during the IQ-test, participants can take
a loan of up to 3.50e. All the earnings from the quiz that are not spent on a pen are lost.
The way the choice of a pen is communicated and what the participants know about the
choice of others varies between treatments. For more details, see section 2.3.
One of the reasons why we choose pens is that we assume that preferences are rather
uni-dimensional in the sense that the price is the most decisive factor in the preference
relation for the five pens, at baseline. This might be not the case for products like
chocolate (see the Descriptives in Section 3.3). Simply speaking, for pens the price is
more important than personal taste for color or material. Hence, there should be no
other reason to buy a lower quality pen except for that it is cheaper. However, this means
even in a standard economic framework without peer e↵ects, incentives to buy a lower
quality pen than one can a↵ord are relatively small or non-existent in our experiment.
This is the case because all the earnings from the IQ-quiz that are not spent on a pen are
lost. Hence, participants would leave money on the table. However, as outlined before, in
the absence of peer e↵ects, there is also no particular incentive to buy a more expensive
pen. Thus, pens are less likely to confound our treatment than other products, as the
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preference is more easily malleable.
2.3 Treatments
We assume that the most revealing signal for being in a particular earnings/performance
group is to buy the pen whose price exactly corresponds to this group. That is because
both pen prices and the earnings structure for the intelligence test are common knowl-
edge:1
Pr i( i = T |ai = T ) > Pr i( i = T |ai 6= T ), (1)
where  i is the type of individual i, T 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} is the type space, which in our case
are the four possible performance groups and ai 2 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is the action space, thus
the 5 possible pens an individual can buy. Pr i( i|ai) represents the probability that the
other participants think individual i belongs to a certain group given a certain action.
Furthermore, we assume that buying the most expensive pen makes it most likely for
the other participants that i belongs to the highest (the fourth) performance group:
Pr i( i = 4|ai = 5) > Pr i( i 6= 4|ai = 5) (2)
With these assumptions in mind, we explain the treatments and their consequences in the
following.
Private Treatment: Control
The private treatment is the control treatment. In the shopping round participants si-
multaneously decide on their individual computer screens which pen they want to buy.
The decision is kept private and they continue to the slider task without any further
intervention. In this treatment, social image concerns and peer information do not occur
as there is no possibility for participants to infer which pen the others buy (which means
Pr i( i|ai) is not defined). The pens are handed over individually in another room next
to the lab and participants leave after payout.
Public Treatment: Social Image Concerns
In the public treatment, participants again first make the decision simultaneously. How-
ever, after everyone made their decision they have to stand up one after another and have
to publicly announce which pen they have chosen. The order in which participants stand
up is random. They are informed beforehand that announcing the consumption decision
is part of the procedure and are shown by the experimenter how they have to do it. Given
1 Our notation is largely taken from Bursztyn and Jensen (2017).
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our previous assumptions, buying a low quality pen is a strong signal for low performance
in the IQ-quiz. Hence, further assuming that being seen as intelligent is a desirable trait,
social image concerns can potentially occur, as Pr i( i|ai) is well-defined. This is true
especially for those individuals who end up in the lower performance groups. Thus, we
assume that low performers in the public treatment are more likely to take a loan to buy
a higher quality pen in order to signal higher intelligence.
Information Treatment: Peer Information
The third treatment is an information treatment, where each respective participant makes
their decision sequentially, in random order, instead of simultaneously. Therefore, we can
show participants in a small table on their screen how many pens of each kind have been
bought previously (see Online Appendix III.VI). Everyone is sitting in a cubicle with high
walls and instructions are solely given on the computer without any interruptions from
the experimenters. In this way, participants are informed about what their peers decided
while no identities are revealed. This means that Pr i( i|ai) is not defined because i
cannot be identified, but that i has several a i that she can consider when making her
own decision. Therefore, peer information can occur but social image concerns are very
unlikely to play a role. We expect to find that participants in this treatment will follow
the decision of those who have already made their decision.
2.4 Slider Task
After the consumption choice, participants perform the slider task developed by Gill and
Prowse (2012). The slider task is a computerized real-e↵ort task where participants have
to move a predefined number of “sliders” to a predefined position with their cursors (see
Online Appendix III.V). In our experiment, they have four minutes to move up to 48
sliders to the value “50.” E↵ort is measured by counting the number of correctly adjusted
sliders. Moving the sliders is rather cumbersome and non-entertaining. Furthermore, we
implement a sharply decreasing marginal return to e↵ort: the first eight correctly adjusted
sliders pay 25 cents each, the next eight earn 15 cents each, the following eight get 10
cents each, the next eight earn 5 cents each, the following eight 3 cents, and the final
eight 2 cents. The slider task gives participants who previously took a loan the chance
to earn additional money to repay that loan. After the slider task, final earnings from
the experiment are calculated. If participants decide to take up a loan and do not exert
enough e↵ort in the slider task to repay it, the money is taken o↵ the participation fee.
The average number of sliders set correctly is 23.83 and the maximum is 48 out of 48.
This is in line with performances in other experiments that involve slider tasks such as
Gill and Prowse (2019).
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2.5 Pre-Experiment Survey
In their invitation email to the experiment, participants are asked to complete an online
survey that was created with Google Forms. Invitation emails are send out one week
before the sessions take place and participants are reminded to fill out the survey 1-2
days beforehand. In the survey, they have to provide an individual ID so that we can
later link these data to the data collected in the experiment.2
In the online survey, participants are asked for their preferred product out of a group
of five homogeneous goods. They have to indicate their favorite type of chocolate, cola,
folder, lip balm, and pen. We show them a picture and the list price of each product (see
Online Appendix III.VII). The five pens are the same pens that they later can buy in the
experiment. Thus, a pre-treatment preference for pens is elicited that we use for a within-
subject analysis. By asking for a variety of homogeneous goods, we can reduce priming
as participants are less likely to remember their choice. We further get an indication on
whether the price is a decisive factor when choosing a pen and whether this is di↵erent
for the other products. Additionally, we include questions on the importance of price,
brands/image, and the opinion of others when buying small, everyday products like the
products in the survey. These questions are measured on a Likert-scale from one to seven.
2.6 Individual Characteristics
We not only want to analyze the possible channels through which peer e↵ects might
increase debt taking but also who responds to which channel. Various studies look at dif-
ferences in socially contingent consumption rather along socio-economic lines (like income,
region, “race” etc.). We want to complement the literature by investigating what kind of
personal attitudes and characteristics make persons more or less susceptible to social image
concerns and responsive to peer information. We concentrate on five distinct personality
concepts, namely cognitive reflection, locus of control, global self-esteem, self-monitoring,
and the Big Five personality traits. Each of these are measured with well-established
methods from the literature. Cognitive Reflection measures a specific type of intelligence:
the tendency to reflect on problems rather than following a wrong intuition when look-
ing for an answer. We use the three questions originally introduced by Frederick (2005).
Locus of Control presents the perceived control over the own life. Here, we use the scale
used in the German Socio-Economic Panel (Wagner et al., 2007), which itself is based
on Rotter (1966). The “Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale” (see Rosenberg, 1979; Ferring and
2 The ID is composed of the third letter of the first name + the last two numbers of the zip code + the
last letter of the last name in capitals + the birthday for each individual participant. In this way, we
can merge the online survey with the experimental data whilst participants remain anonymous and no
sensitive data is collected by the researcher.
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Filipp, 1996; von Collani and Herzberg, 2003) is employed to assess Global Self-Esteem
(GSE). In contrast to specific self-esteem, GSE is an overall feeling of self-worth that is
not attached to a particular situation. Self-Monitoring describes the willingness and/or
ability of individuals to adapt their behavior to di↵erent social situations and is measured
with the revised self-monitoring scale by Snyder (1974) (see Snyder and Gangestad, 1986;
Graf, 2004). The Big Five are measured using the short version of the big five inventory
“BFI-S” (John and Srivastava, 1999; Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005). For detailed hypotheses,
as well as results on the relationship between these personality traits and susceptibility
to social comparison, see Online Appendix I.I.
Additionally, we collect socio-economic variables like sex and age as well as data on
lab experience, financial literacy, and risk preference. The financial literacy scale is based
on Lusardi and Mitchell (2008) and complemented by own designed questions. Risk
preference is measured with the question on general risk taking by Dohmen et al. (2011).
2.7 Procedure and Participants
Our experiment took place at Technical University Berlin in November 2018. Including
three pilot sessions, 27 experimental sessions were run. Treatments were randomized at the
session level and each session lasted between 42 and 58 minutes.3 On average, participants
earned 14.33e, including a show-up fee of 5e and a participation fee of 3.50e. In total, 305
students from various disciplines participated. All sessions had at least nine participants
and most consisted of twelve participants. The experiment is programmed using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) and participants are recruited from the subject pool of the Technical
University laboratory via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment is registered in the
AEA RCT Registry, RCT ID: AEARCTR-0003597.4
In Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics for the whole sample and the control
group as well as the di↵erences between control group and the two treatments, respectively.
For the main analysis, we exclude the 35 observations from our three pilot sessions, as
we changed the experimental procedure substantially after the pilot. As can be seen, our
treatments are gender-balanced, with the average participant around 23 years old, having
studied for 3 semesters, a monthly income of ca. 690e, and already participated in at
least one other experiment in the lab. There is also no di↵erence in intelligence as proxied
by absolute performance in the IQ-quiz and cognitive reflection between treatments. At
a first glance, the number of imbalances seem to be particularly high in our experiment
in comparison to other studies. However, given the sample size and the large number
3 There is a significant correlation between duration and treatments with mean duration of 46, 49, and
53 minutes, respectively. The di↵erence can be explained by varieties in the procedure.
4 See https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3597.
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of variables we are looking at, this is actually not surprising. Furthermore, an F-test on
joint orthogonality of all variables on the treatment cannot be rejected (p-value=0.14).
We still control for the imbalanced variables in most of our specifications.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics across Treatments
Full Sample Control Control-Public Control-Info
Male 0.48 0.48  0.00 0.01
Age 22.86 22.57  0.58  0.29
Education 3.36 3.27  0.20⇤⇤  0.06
Students 0.97 0.99 0.05⇤ 0.02
Semester 3.68 3.50  0.62 0.09
Student Job 0.28 0.27  0.03 0.01
Mthl. Income 688.36 713.84 18.35 60.98
Risk Preference 5.34 5.81 0.85⇤⇤ 0.64⇤
Lab Experience 1.89 1.95 0.07 0.12
Know Someone 0.31 0.18  0.22⇤⇤  0.17⇤
Persons in Session 11.33 11.67 0.46⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤
Correct Control Questions 4.74 4.76  0.01 0.08
Correct Quiz Questions 4.43 4.55  0.00 0.37
Financial Literacy 4.59 4.70 0.27 0.07
Cognitive Reflection 1.91 2.01 0.19 0.12
Conscientiousness  0.01  0.12  0.14  0.20
Neuroticism 0.03  0.06  0.22  0.07
Extraversion  0.02 0.08 0.28⇤ 0.04
Openess  0.02 0.08 0.18 0.13
Agreeableness  0.01  0.13  0.26⇤  0.10
Self-Esteem  0.01 0.19 0.37⇤⇤ 0.23⇤
Locus of Control 0.00 0.13 0.29⇤ 0.10
Self-Monitoring  0.02  0.02 0.02  0.03
Observations 270 93 182 181
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Participants in the public treatment have a higher level of education but are slightly less
likely to study than participants in the control treatment. They are less risk-seeking
and less extraverted but more agreeable and have a larger internal locus of control. We
find di↵erences between the control and information treatments for risk-seeking and self-
esteem but not in the education domain. Finally, although there were significantly less
participants per session in the public and information treatment (which is, however, ex-
ogenous to the participants), participants in these treatment are more likely to know
another person in their session. Since this study analyses peer e↵ects, endogeneity in the
peer group size could seriously jeopardize identification. However, given that participants
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are not aware beforehand in which treatment they will end up and that we randomized
the order of treatments between daytime and weekdays, we do not have reason to believe
that real-life peers were more likely to sort into one or another treatment.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptives
Overall, around 20% of the participants actually take a loan and the average loan amount
conditional on take-up is about 1.30e. This means that, on average, participants take up
a loan to buy a pen that is one quality level higher than the one they can a↵ord with quiz
earnings. However, as can be seen in Table 2, these numbers di↵er across treatments.
Table 2: Summary Statistics Outcome Variables
Observations Mean Stand. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Control Treatment
Loan Amount 93 0.22 0.62 0.00 3.50
Loan Dummy 93 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Cond. Loan Amount 16 1.28 0.95 0.50 3.50
Public Treatment
Loan Amount 89 0.23 0.53 0.00 2.50
Loan Dummy 89 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Cond. Loan Amount 19 1.08 0.63 0.50 2.50
Info Treatment
Loan Amount 88 0.31 0.73 0.00 3.50
Loan Dummy 88 0.20 0.41 0.00 1.00
Cond. Loan Amount 18 1.50 0.92 0.50 3.50
Summary statistics are given in Euro for Loan Amount and Cond. Loan Amount.
Figure 2: Distribution of Pens Bought in the Experiment
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In Figure 2, we see that participants borrow, with a considerable number buying the
five-star pen, for which there is no corresponding earnings level. The two-star pen is
the most frequently bought pen, whilst the three-star pen is the least popular. Most
importantly, we can see from the graphic that people buy pens that do not correspond to
their earnings level, as not all bars are of the same height.
3.2 Loan Take-Up
In Table 3, the e↵ects of the socially contingent treatments on loan take-up are estimated.5
For both treatments, there are no significant e↵ects on whether participants took a loan
nor on the amount, as seen in Columns (1) and (2). When controlling for imbalances,
as seen in Column (3), e↵ect sizes are much smaller for the loan amount in the public
treatment, even negative, which suggests that participants in the public treatment actually
take a smaller loan than those in the control group. Column (4) shows that there is
absolutely no e↵ect on the loan dummy when we control for imbalances.
Given the results on loan amounts for the control group and our sample size, we would
be able to detect moderate e↵ect sizes (Cohen’s d = 0.37, assuming a power=80% and
↵=5%). This is almost exactly the same minimum detectable e↵ect size we calculated in
our pre-analysis plan and slightly larger than the e↵ect found in comparable studies (for
example Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2018, find an e↵ect of 0.3). However, the actual
e↵ect size of the public treatment is extremely small (Cohen’s d = -0.017), the confidence
intervals lie almost symmetrically around the null and never reach 0.3 in the positive
direction. Hence, we are relatively confident that participants, in general, do not take a
larger loan due to social image concerns.6
5 In all our regressions, we estimate standard errors that are bootstrapped and clustered at session level.
However, given the subsequent small number of clusters, we also calculate p-values using wild cluster
bootstrap following the advice of Cameron et al. (2008). All our results of interest are robust to this
specification.
6 There is the possibility that participants hide their low performance, but we still do not find an e↵ect:
they simply lie when announcing the decision publicly. Controlling for this possibility by cross-checking
each announcement with the data, we do not find a single person who lied in the public treatment.
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Table 3: E↵ects of Treatments on Loan Take-Up
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment 0.010 0.041 –0.017 0.006
(0.118) (0.088) (0.137) (0.095)
Info Treatment 0.086 0.033 0.073 0.003
(0.126) (0.078) (0.114) (0.073)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 270 270 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
E↵ect sizes for the loan amount are larger in the information treatment, but standard
errors are considerably high. However, observations in the information treatment might
be path-dependent within each session and, in this Table, we do not account for this.
Table 4, tries to take this into account. In Columns (1) and (2), we control for the place
in the order in which participants decide in the information treatment. Those who have
to decide later are more likely to adjust their behavior as they receive more information.7
We find a significant order e↵ect on the probability to take a loan at all, however, no
significant e↵ect on the amount taken. The e↵ect size is small, which might be the case
because early deciders can either set a high or a low benchmark. If early deciders choose
low quality pens, there might be no reason for followers to take a loan. Therefore, in
Columns (3) and (4), we control for the average of pens bought up to the point when the
respective participant has to decide. Here, we find an insignificant, albeit positive, e↵ect
on loan take up and a negative e↵ect on the likelihood. Eventually, it seems that there
is some adjustment in the information treatment. Thus, in general, there seems to be an
e↵ect of the info treatment if controlling for path dependency but e↵ects seem to be too
small to reach significance.8
7 Since in the other two treatments there is no order that matters for the decision, we use the subject
number to order these observations in the various specifications.
8 Both corrections have advantages and disadvantages. We prefer the order approach as it allows us to
keep all observations, which is not the case if using the mean approach.
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Table 4: E↵ects of Treatments on Loan Take-Up, Info Treatment Correction
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment –0.108 –0.173 –0.016 0.070
(0.210) (0.118) (0.466) (0.368)
Order –0.017 –0.010*
(0.014) (0.006)
Interaction Order*Info 0.028 0.028**
(0.025) (0.014)
Mean Prev. Pens 0.023 0.051
(0.114) (0.116)
Interaction Mean*Info 0.034 –0.015
(0.169) (0.138)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Correction Order Order Mean Pen Mean Pen
Observations 248 248 226 226
Control treatment is reference category. Coe cients on public treatment not reported. Controlled for
variables with significant di↵erences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Summarized, when looking at between-subject e↵ects, results are rather surprising.
The public treatment has no e↵ect on loan take up, if anything it seems that people are
borrowing less in the public treatment. The information treatment seems to have larger
e↵ects. In the next subsection, we examine within-subject results to gain further insights.
Results on how di↵erent personal characteristics interact with peer e↵ects are in Online
Appendix I.II.
3.3 Deviation from Pre-Experiment Choice
In this subsection, we compare pen choices in the pre-experiment survey to pen choices
during the experiment. Hence, we can examine whether our treatments let participants
choose to buy a di↵erent pen from the one they claimed to use in everyday life. Therefore,
we compare the pen that participants actually buy in the experiment to the pen they
buy and use most in everyday life as stated in the online survey. This is not a test
between stated and revealed preference, as in the online survey we already ask explicitly
for usage and not preference. More importantly, we expect a di↵erence between the two
pen choices, even for the control treatment because of the experimental design in general.
In this sense, we are interested in whether the treatments changed the choice of the pen
above and beyond the change already induced by the experimental setting. As argued
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in Subsection 2.3, participants have a large incentive to buy the pen that corresponds to
their earnings level, especially if the price is the most important criterion for the choice
of pens. The latter assumption seems to be valid, especially compared to other goods,
as seen in Online Appendix Figure II.I. In total, we collected 323 answers in our online
survey and approximately 50% choose the cheapest pen. For all the other goods, no more
than 24% ever choose the cheapest option. For example for folders, which belong to the
same group of goods as pens (stationery), only 16% choose the cheapest.
Unfortunately, despite having more survey responses than participants, not all our
participants answered the online survey or used di↵erent IDs such that we cannot merge
their responses with the experimental data. We are able to match 219 cases that are
evenly distributed between treatment groups (for each treatment we have about 80% who
answered the online survey). Furthermore, there are no significant personal di↵erences
between those for whom we have valid answers and for those we do not (see Appendix
Table II.I).
In Table 5, we regress the di↵erent pen choices on treatments. As expected, there are
no significant e↵ects on pre-experiment choices (Column (1)). However, there are also
no significant e↵ects on choices in the experiment (Column (2)). Interestingly, there is
a change in signs, which means that there is a considerable di↵erence between the two
coe cients. This di↵erence is marginally significant in the public treatment but only if
we do not control for imbalances. Nevertheless, it seems that participants in the public
treatment not only take a smaller loan but choose a cheaper pen in general.
Table 5: Pre-Experiment Choice and Adjustment
Pen Before Pen After Di↵erence
(1) (2) (3)
Public Treatment 0.098 –0.061 –0.237
(0.226) (0.231) (0.246)
Info Treatment –0.227 0.022 0.262
(0.254) (0.179) (0.289)
Mean Control Group 2.00 2.69 0.71
Observations 201 248 201
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Similar to Table 4, Table 6 shows the results for the info treatment, but controlling for
order e↵ects. Here, we find highly significant e↵ects. Participants in the information
treatment who decide later in the order buy a more expensive pen and, thereby, a pen
15
that is further away from their pre-experimental choice.
Table 6: Pre-Experiment Choice and Adjustment, Info Treatment Correction
Before After Di↵erence
(1) (2) (3)
Info Treatment –0.101 –0.550* –0.567
(0.473) (0.326) (0.520)
Order 0.035 –0.064*** –0.102***
(0.045) (0.023) (0.036)
Interaction Order*Info –0.022 0.092*** 0.134**
(0.055) (0.035) (0.054)
Mean Control Group 2.00 2.69 0.71
Correction Order Order Order
Observations 201 248 201
Control treatment is reference category. Coe cients on public treatment not reported. Controlled for
variables with significant di↵erences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.4 Leaving Money on the Table
So far, we have seen that participants in the information treatment are more likely to take
a loan and, hence, more likely to buy a more expensive pen, if they have to make their
choice later in the order. At the same time, we have seen that, in the public treatment,
there is neither a significant e↵ect on loan take up nor on the choice of pens compared to
the choice in the pre-experiment survey. The surprising non-results in the latter treatment
seem to not only be driven by small e↵ect sizes in combination with a small sample, but
e↵ects seem to be non-existent or actually go in the opposite direction.
We here examine this further by looking at whether participants leave money on the
table by buying a cheaper pen than the one they could a↵ord according to their earnings.
In Table 7, we determine if people leave money on the table and how much they leave.
Results are striking, as participants in the public treatment buy significantly more lower
quality pens and are more likely to do this than those in the control treatment. As
expected, this e↵ect is driven by high performers, which means we have an asymmetry:
high performers are adjusting downwards but low performers do not adjust upwards.
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Table 7: Buying a Lower Quality than A↵ordable
Lost Amount Lost Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment 0.115*** 0.076** –0.066 –0.033
(0.043) (0.030) (0.073) (0.044)
Info Treatment 0.068 0.067 –0.018 0.005
(0.056) (0.053) (0.044) (0.051)
Performance 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Interaction Rank*Public 0.026* 0.016**
(0.015) (0.007)
Interaction Rank*Info 0.013 0.009
(0.009) (0.008)
Mean Control Group 0.038 0.043 0.038 0.043
Observations 248 248 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
As in the previous subsections, we repeat these calculation for the info treatment
by controlling for order e↵ects. Results are shown in Table 8. We can see here that
people in the information treatment are also more likely to leave money on the table
than people in the control group. However, in line with previous results, this e↵ect is
counteracted if participants make their choices later in the order. Thus, in contrast to the
public treatment, there seems to be a rather symmetric adjustment in the information
treatment.
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Table 8: Buying a Lower Quality than A↵ordable, Info Treatment Correction
Lost Amount Lost Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment 0.187** 0.183** 0.203** 0.233**
(0.078) (0.085) (0.091) (0.107)
Order 0.012* 0.012* 0.014* 0.013*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Interaction Order*Info –0.020** –0.020* –0.021* –0.026**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Mean Control Group 0.038 0.043 0.038 0.043
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 270 270 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Coe cients on public treatment not reported. Controlled for
variables with significant di↵erences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.5 Results on E↵ort Provision
As described above, the choice of pen is followed by the slider task. It is our expectation
that participants who took a loan in the consumption stage will try to make up for their
loss in income by exerting additional e↵ort in the slider task. In Table 9, however, we
find exactly the opposite: the amount of loan taken is significantly negatively related to
e↵ort. The treatments themselves seem to have no additional e↵ect on the e↵ect exerted
in the slider task. In Column (2), we can see that there is a positive relationship between
performing well in the IQ-quiz and performing well in the slider task. One can only
speculate about the reasons behind this. It is possible that some people have a high
general ability. Alternatively, low performers may have been demotivated by their low
performance and, as such, put little e↵ort into the slider task. In Column (3), we see
that the e↵ect of having taken a loan on putting no e↵ort into the slider task is largest in
the public treatment. All the results combined indicate that having taken a loan in the
consumption round may have demotivating e↵ects later in the experiment.
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Table 9: E↵ort and Loan Take-Up
E↵ort Slider Task E↵ort Slider Task E↵ort Slider Task
(1) (2) (3)
Public Treatment 1.064 0.952 1.931
(1.386) (1.416) (1.551)
Info Treatment 2.131 2.053 2.145
(1.547) (1.555) (1.647)
Loan Amount –3.397*** –3.254*** –2.023*
(0.862) (0.866) (1.172)
Performance 0.348* 0.359*
(0.190) (0.191)
Interaction Loan*Public –4.023**
(1.574)
Interaction Loan*Info –0.748
(2.091)
Mean Control Group 22.61 22.61 22.61
Observations 248 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Given the low loan take-up, the payo↵ from the slider task is too generous. Only two
persons did not manage to work enough to repay their loans, all the others mostly obtained
a surplus from the slider task. This makes it hard to draw meaningful conclusions, since
participants did not have to work more to repay their debts.
4 Robustness
Controlling for the Pre-Experiment Choice There are slight, albeit not significant,
imbalances across treatments in the pen participants have chosen in the online survey.
Therefore, we control for this pre-experimental choice in Online Appendix Tables II.II
and II.III and test if our main results are robust to this inclusion. Although our sample
size is smaller, as not all participants answered the online survey, results regarding loan
take-up in the two treatments stay the same. There is no significant positive e↵ect of the
public treatment on taking a loan. In this specification, coe cients are larger in size but
all of them are negative. For the information treatment, we again find a significant and
positive interaction between treatment and order of deciding. The e↵ect is furthermore of
a similar size than before. Interestingly, the more expensive the chosen pen in the online
survey is, the larger is the loan amount in the lab. This indicates that participants did not
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give fun answers in the online survey, which is not incentivized, but reported truthfully.
Deviation from Pre-Experiment Choice - Dummy Given that participants deviate in
both directions from their pre-experimental choice, we test if, in total, the treatments
make it less or more likely to buy the pen that one actually prefers. In Online Appendix
Table II.IV, we find a small negative e↵ect on the likelihood to buy the preferred pen,
which is, however, not significant. If we control for order e↵ects, the treatments seem to
increase the likelihood to buy the preferred pen for first movers, but this e↵ects fades out
with the place in the order. Again, these e↵ects are not significant as standard errors are
extremely large. In general, the table supports our previous results as found in Tables 5
and 6.
Using a Di↵erent Order in Control and Public Treatment To correct for path depen-
dency in the information treatment, we control for the order in which participants decide.
However, since participants decide simultaneously in the control and public treatment,
we have to use an artificial order for their choices. For our main results, we use the most
straightforward order our data provide, which are the individual subject numbers that
z-Tree is assigning to participants within each session. As a robustness check, we use a
di↵erent ordering that is based on actual orders in the information treatment. For each
potential number of total participants in the session, which are 9, 10, 11, or 12, we ran-
domly draw one information treatment session and implement its ordering in the other
two treatments. Results are presented in Online Appendix Table II.V. The interaction
term between loan take-up and information treatment is almost the same in size and
significance as the term in Table 4. The coe cients for leaving money on the table are
smaller and not significant anymore. However, they still point in the same direction as
before in Table 8 and their size is still large.
5 Discussion
We find some results in this paper that we did not hypothesize. Our two main findings
regarding the debt taking and consumption choices are, first that participants buy worse
quality pens than they can a↵ord. This e↵ect is weaker for participants in the info
treatment who make their choice later in the order of participants. Secondly, and most
strikingly, participants do not want to signal intelligence to other participants. Here,
we discuss four potential reasons for the observed findings. These are “standing-out-
aversion,” “smarty-pants-e↵ect,” “blame aversion,” and conformity.
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“Standing-Out-Aversion” Jones and Linardi (2014) formulate a simple model and find
evidence for what they call wallflowers: Some people are averse to being seen as too selfish
or as too generous, they do not want to stand out with their level of generosity. Therefore,
they adjust their action to what they believe the average is doing. If we directly translate
this model from reputational to social image concerns and apply it to our experimental
design, we should see that loan take-up is the highest in the public treatment. Given that
the payout and performance structure is common knowledge, we assume that participants
expect that the average person buys a two-star or three-star pen. Thus, low performing
persons would have to take a loan to match the mean decision. This is not what we
find. We do find that high performing persons leave money on the table to buy a cheaper
pen in the public treatment. However, this asymmetry does not support “standing out
aversion” as an explanation. Further evidence against this explanation is that we find no
di↵erential e↵ects for females and males (see Appendix Table II.VI). Jones and Linardi
(2014) find females are especially likely to be wallflowers and, if anything, our coe cients
point in the exact opposite direction.9
“Smarty-Pants-E↵ect” Our participants avoid signaling higher intelligence by not
taking a loan and buying a cheaper pen than they can a↵ord. McManus and Rao (2015)
find similar results to ours in a very di↵erent experiment. They present three explanations
for this avoidance, of which two might be present in our setting. The first might be what
they call “smarty-pants-e↵ect,” which means that participants neither want to appear
smarter than their peers nor to be perceived as arrogant. This same e↵ect is more promi-
nently known as the “acting white” e↵ect (e.g. Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Bursztyn
et al., 2019).
“Blame Aversion” An alternative explanation is what we call “blame aversion,” which
relates to social preferences. There is evidence that persons care about negative external-
ities of their own performance on others in cases where relative performance determines
payout (e.g Bandiera et al., 2005). In our experiment, high performing participants are
the reason why low performing participants can only a↵ord a low quality pen. Thus, in-
equality is inevitable and self-esteem damage is done. However, it might be the case that
high performers do not want to publicly take the blame for others being worse o↵ and,
therefore, pretend to be a low performer. Eventually, with both kinds of explanations,
9 Another consideration is that participants in our design are not exactly standing out when buying a low
or high-quality pen as a quarter of participants is expected to do so given the payo↵ categories. Still,
since we did not elicit beliefs about what participants think others will do, we do not know whether
some persons might think that they would be the only one making extreme choices. However, in this
case, even more participants in the public treatment should be willing to take a loan.
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smarty-pants-e↵ect and blame aversion, participants in the public treatment might have
social image concerns, just not the ones we anticipated.
Conformity Looking at the coe cients for the information treatment and controlling
for order e↵ects, we find a significantly high and positive e↵ect of buying a too cheap pen.
This slowly goes down with the order of deciding. Additionally, the number of di↵erent
modes in bought pens is smaller in the information treatment than in the control treat-
ment, albeit not significantly. Standard errors are large but the e↵ect size is relatively
large as well (see Appendix Table II.VII). Since we also find some significant, though much
smaller, e↵ects for loan take-up, it seems that decisions in the information treatment are
mildly converging to some lower midpoint. In contrast to the public treatment, however,
participants cannot observe the individual behavior of others in this treatment. Hence,
the last two paragraphs presented explanations for the observed behavior in the public
treatment, however, not for the information treatment. A preference for conformity seems
to explain the observed pattern in the information treatment fairly well. As conformity,
we define the intrinsic preference to align consumption decisions to those of others with-
out others even learning about this (see Goeree and Yariv, 2015). Alternative motives,
like self-image concerns and pure information gathering, are unlikely in our setting as
participants especially adjust from above and pens are everyday products. Overall, some
participants are actually willing to incur cutbacks as either they have to take on debt or
end up with a lower quality pen to conform.
6 Conclusion
The number of over-indebted households is increasing worldwide (IMF, 2017). Hence,
it is increasingly important to understand the drivers behind this process. This paper
contributes to the emerging literature on household borrowing behavior. It analyzes the
e↵ects of social comparison on debt taking, examining two potential channels. Here, we
argue that social comparison is one of the reasons leading to increased debt taking, which
in turn leads to overindebtedness.
It is our aim to disentangle two channels that underlie social comparison. Therefore,
we take our research question to the lab, as it is di cult to do this outside the lab.
We design two treatments through which we want to separately examine social image
concerns and peer information. While the former relates to how an individual wants to
be perceived by others, the latter relates to how an individual themselves perceives the
decision of others. Few studies disentangle these two e↵ects.
The possible biggest caveat of our study is that borrowing in the lab is highly artificial,
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since participants cannot leave the lab indebted. Still, we believe that our experimental
design is di↵erent from standard spending decisions and that participants thought of the
possible loan they could take as creating a temporary debt. The fact that participants
who took a loan did not work more means that they actually left the lab with less money
than the others.
Our results on how social comparison might a↵ect borrowing are quite surprising.
Social image concerns lead to underspending in our setup, hence, the exact opposite of
what we expected. Potential reasons are that participants do not want to be perceived
as more intelligent, which is contrary to our expectation, or that the more successful do
not want to be blamed for the failures of others. We acknowledge that these reasons are
peculiar for our setting and might di↵er in other environments where, for example, status
is not only defined by intelligence and no perfect correlation between success of one group
and failure of another group exists. We find striking results on peer information. There is
convincing evidence for an intrinsic inclination to conform, which leads less to more debt
taking by individuals in the lower tail but more to underspending by those in the upper
tail of the performance distribution.
Our findings highlight that not only is borrowing underresearched but also intrinsic
motivations like conformity and their e↵ects on consumption and borrowing. Conformity
leads to “sub-optimal” decisions on both sides of the distribution in our experiment as
participants deviate from their intrinsic preference elicited before the experiment took
place. In real life, conformity might disadvantageously hurt the low income households.
Especially in countries with high income inequality, like emerging markets, conforming to
an average level of consumption might lead to severe financial distress. Research looking
at how inequality in neighborhoods a↵ects financial distress seem to confirm this concern.
Furthermore, that the upper end of the distribution is adjusting more in our setting might
be purely driven by the fact the decision only involves simple pens. It cannot be expected
that the rich downward adjust their consumption when it comes to products where quality
di↵erences matter much more. Given the extensive research on status consumption in the
last 120 years, future research should concentrate more on peer information e↵ects on
debt-financed consumption, similar to what is done in the domain of pro-social behavior.
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I Susceptibility to Social Comparison
In the following subsections, we present all the hypotheses as stated in our pre-analysis
plan, including those on which personality characteristics are more or less susceptible to
social comparison e↵ects. Subsequently, we discuss the results on the personality types.
I.I Hypotheses
To answer our main research question, we look at the di↵erence in the amount and the
probability of loans taken between those in the private treatment and those in the other
two treatments. Thus, these variables focus on the di↵erences between the amount that
someone should have spent according to standard economic predictions and the amount
that someone actually spends. Furthermore, we look at within subject di↵erences in
what participants reported to be their quality preference for the pen in our online survey
and what they actually buy during the experiment. To assess which personalities are
more susceptible to social comparison e↵ects, we interact the personality traits with our
treatments. Finally, we also analyze the amount of e↵ort exerted in the slider task to
investigate who is willing to work more in the future to actually avoid financial distress
because of socially contingent consumption.
Question 1: “Are people willing to pay out of their future income because of social
image/status concerns?”
We expect that at least some people are willing to do so. As previously explained,
buying a low quality pen is a credible signal for being a “lower” cognitive ability type, as
it can be directly linked to worse performance in the test of intelligence. Since we assume
that cognitive ability is a desirable trait for our student sample, for some persons the
additional benefit of being perceived as having higher cognitive ability is large enough to
o↵set the potential costs of borrowing or of “working more” (see hypothesis 1a). In our
experiment, participants can borrow money without interest, reducing potential costs of
borrowing to general opportunity costs of spending more instead of keeping money. Some
participants in the public treatment are, thus, willing to use their future income to buy
a higher quality pen than they can a↵ord in order to hide their true performance. Since
social image concerns can only arise when individual decisions are made publicly, these
concerns neither arise in the private nor the information treatment.
Hypothesis 1: “Participants in the public treatment are more likely to take out a loan
and take out a higher loan amount to buy a higher quality pen than participants in the
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private treatment.”
Participants in the public treatment who take out a loan, because they want to convey a
certain type, end up with less money after the shopping round than their control treat-
ment counterparts who cannot engage in socially contingent consumption. Assuming only
weak fatigue, the marginal rate of substitution of not exerting e↵ort in the slider task for
money should be larger for those subjects, as they have a debt on their accounts. Dif-
ferently speaking, persons who take out a loan might be willing to work more because
they want to settle their debts.1 Dtermining if individuals with a loan exert more e↵ort
is interesting because, in real life, higher consumption could be financed by debt or by
working more (e.g. Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; Bowles and Park, 2005). Hence, some
of our participants could already have internalized working more in the slider task to take
out a higher loan.
Hypothesis 1a: “Participants in the public treatment will exert more e↵ort in the
slider task than participants in the private treatment, because they took out a higher
loan before.”
Question 2: “Can the peer e↵ect on visible consumption mostly linked to social im-
age/status concerns partly be explained by peer information?”
A di↵erent explanation why people adjust their consumption to peers is that they are
intrinsically motivated or because they receive information about the usefulness/quality of
a product. Intrinsic motivation could be a form of self-image concern, a desire to imitate or
a desire to conform to others. Pure information about the quality is especially important
if the individual is not familiar with the product. To analyze whether the e↵ect of peer
information is comparable to that of social image concerns, we designed the information
treatment in such a way that only new information but no social image concerns can
arise.2 Our prediction is that peer information only has a small e↵ect on the decisions in
our setting. The pens we use are trivial goods and quality di↵erences are comparatively
small, which is why we expect the intrinsic and informational gain to be small. However,
we acknowledge that this is not necessarily true for goods that are usually considered
1 An alternative explanation would be that these persons do not want to lose money they already have in
their mental accounts. They do not like the feeling of creating a debt that eventually will be deducted
from their participation fee, which is already part of their endowment.
2 Given our experimental design, observations in the information treatment within a session are path
dependent. We try to control for this issue in our analysis.
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in field studies on conspicuous consumption, e.g. cars, travel destinations, restaurant
visits, and so forth. In this sense, our treatment for information e↵ects lies at the lower
bound. Finding significant results would possibly imply that a substantial share of visible
consumption is actually not driven by conspicuous consumption.
Hypothesis 2: “Participants in the information treatment will take out a higher loan
than participants in the private treatment, but a smaller loan than participants in the
public treatment.”
Hypothesis 2a: “Participants in the information treatment will exert more e↵ort in the
slider task than participants in the private treatment, but less than participants in the
public treatment.”
Question 3: “Are there certain types of personality that correlate with larger socially
contingent consumption?”
Since cognitive reflection is related to standard IQ measures, we expect small e↵ects in
our setting. Participants with high cognitive reflection are expected to perform well in
our intelligence task and, therefore, can buy high quality pens without needing to take
out a loan. This reduces the di↵erence between the control and the other treatments.
Nevertheless, we hypothesize to find a negative relation between CR and susceptibility to
social image concerns after controlling for performance. Royzman et al. (2014) find that
moral values of reflective persons are more independent of existing social norms. We see
this as indication of putting less value on what other people think about oneself.
Hypothesis 3a: “Participants with higher cognitive reflection are less susceptible to
social image concerns.”
We expect higher internal locus of control to decrease the reliance on social networks and
perceived peer pressure, because it relates to the belief that individuals are responsible
for their lives themselves.
Hypothesis 3b: “Participants with rather internal locus of control are less susceptible
to social image concerns.”
Self-esteem and power, the capability to control other people, are related concepts and
power a↵ects self-esteem (Wojciszke and Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007). Since research
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shows that feeling powerful decreases conspicuous consumption, we expect an analogous
e↵ect for self-esteem.
Hypothesis 3c: “Participants with higher self-esteem are less susceptible to social image
concerns.”
High self-monitors adjust their self-presentation more than low self-monitors to signal a
desired type. High self-monitors have a more precise estimate of the social desirability of
an action and care more about being perceived as a higher type.
Hypothesis 3d: “Participants with higher self-monitoring are more susceptible to social
image concerns.”
Looking at the Big Five personality traits, we concentrate on the traits of extraversion,
openness, and agreeableness. For the remaining two traits, we do not have a clear pre-
diction. Extraversion is shown to be positively correlated to status consumption of low
status individuals (Landis and Gladstone, 2017). Therefore, we expect it to be related
to social image concerns. For openness and agreeableness, we only formulate hypotheses
regarding their e↵ect on responding to peer information. A high level of openness means
to be open to new experiences, ideas, and variety seeking. Therefore, openness drives
participants away from the mean decision of others, which is considered as not innovative
and unexciting. Agreeableness is closely related to the desire for conformity and cooper-
ation, which is why we predict it to be related to anchoring the own decision on others’
decisions.
Hypothesis 3e: “Participants with a higher level of extraversion are more susceptible
to social image concerns.”
Hypothesis 3f: “Participants with a higher level of openness will anchor their decision
less to the average decision in the information treatment than those with a lower level.”
Hypothesis 3g: “Participants with a higher level of agreeableness will anchor their
decision closer to the average decision in the information treatment than those with a
lower level.”
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I.II Results on Personality Types
For all characteristics listed in Table I.I, we only derived hypotheses for the interaction
with the public treatment and, therefore, do not report coe cients for the information
treatment. We first look at cognitive reflection (CR). Since we find a highly significant
correlation between CR and actual performance in the IQ-quiz, we additionally control
for performance. As expected, a better performance is significantly negatively correlated
with taking a loan. Interestingly, for the control treatment, a higher CR is significantly
positively related to loan take-up. However, we find a negative e↵ect of cognitive reflection
on loan take-up in the public treatment. The e↵ect is rather small and only marginally
significant on the extensive margin. However, if we do not control for possibly endogenous
self-esteem, the e↵ects are stronger and highly significant. In general, the interaction
e↵ect is robust to various specifications and more than o↵sets the positive e↵ect of CR
in the control. Because this study is slightly under-powered to estimate e↵ects of this
size, we are still cautious in interpreting the results. Still, it seems that individuals with
higher cognitive reflection do adjust their decision because of social image concerns, but
in opposite direction to the others. In this sense, we have to reject hypothesis 3a.
The results for the interaction between public treatment and locus of control (LOC) are
shown in the second panel of Table I.I. Internal LOC is also correlated with performance
but to a smaller extent. We do not find a significant interaction e↵ect for the probability
to take up a loan at all, although the coe cient points in the right direction.3 Given the
rather large standard errors and the imbalance of LOC between control and public, we
view our results as inconclusive. Thus, we also cannot confirm hypothesis 3b.
For global self-esteem (GSE), we find an insignificant interaction term and a rather
small e↵ect size. As participants with higher GSE are overly represented in the public
treatment or higher GSE might be induced by the treatment, we would expect larger
e↵ects in negative direction: The treatment could give those persons who performed well
in the quiz a confidence boost, who can now announce this publicly (and vice versa).
Actually, there is a mild correlation between quiz performance and GSE. However, this
should increase the e↵ect size in favor of our hypothesis, which is not the case. Thus, we
reject hypothesis 3c.
3 If we apply wild cluster bootstrap, we additionally find an overall significant positive e↵ect of LOC at
the 10% level.
vi
Table I.I: Personality and Loan Take-Up
Loan Amount Loan Dummy
Cognitive Reflection
CR 0.100*** 0.094***
(0.031) (0.028)
Interaction CR*Public –0.128 –0.116*
(0.084) (0.065)
Public Treatment 0.249 0.244
(0.210) (0.153)
Locus of Control
LOC 0.056 0.054
(0.082) (0.036)
Interaction LOC*Public –0.094 –0.101
(0.104) (0.064)
Public Treatment –0.012 0.013
(0.138) (0.093)
Self-Esteem
GSE –0.100 –0.049
(0.080) (0.071)
Interaction GSE*Public –0.047 –0.027
(0.131) (0.092)
Public Treatment 0.006 0.023
(0.146) (0.102)
Self-Monitoring
SM 0.046 0.023
(0.049) (0.036)
Interaction SM*Public 0.017 0.020
(0.072) (0.069)
Public Treatment –0.016 0.003
(0.137) (0.096)
Extraversion
EV –0.030 –0.001
(0.055) (0.048)
Interaction EV*Public 0.148 0.093
(0.098) (0.066)
Public Treatment –0.010 0.013
(0.134) (0.098)
Observations 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Coe cients on info treatment not reported. Controlled for
variables with significant di↵erences and performance in IQ-quiz. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and
clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Similar as for GSE, we do not find any e↵ect for self-monitoring (SM). The e↵ect
size is fairly small and e↵ects are not significant at all. Interestingly, SM is negatively
correlated to quiz performance, which even should increase the potential e↵ect. Based on
these results, we also reject hypothesis 3d.
The last panel in the table presents the results on extraversion (EV). The e↵ects go in
hypothesized direction, but are never significant. E↵ect sizes, though, are of moderate size
(Cohen’s d ⇠ 0.24 ) and p-values are “flirting with significance.” As previously noted, our
study is under-powered for this e↵ect size and, hence, we are hesitant to reject hypothesis
3e but also cannot confirm it, which means results are inconclusive.
Hypotheses 3f and 3g address the anchoring of decisions to others in the information
treatment. To measure anchoring, we again look at the di↵erence between pre-experiment
choice and actual choice, interacting the information treatment with the two personality
traits. In Table I.II, we first investigate whether persons with a higher level of openness
deviate less from their individual preference as they receive information about others.
First, we notice a strange di↵erential e↵ect for the pre-experimental choice. In general, a
higher level of openness is related to choosing a more expensive pen in the online survey
but the interaction has a large significantly negative e↵ect. Eventually, persons with a
higher level of openness who were assigned to the information treatment choose a cheaper
pen in the survey. However, as treatment assignment is random, this is most likely an
artefact of the small sample size. Nevertheless, we find a considerably large positive
e↵ect for the actual choice and the di↵erence between the choice before and during the
experiment. This means that we have to reject hypothesis 3f, as apparently it is exactly the
opposite: persons with a higher level of openness deviate more from their pre-experiment
preference.
Panel 2 in Table I.II, shows the e↵ect of agreeableness on anchoring. Here, we do not
find significant e↵ects and the di↵erence between pre-experimental and actual choice is
small in size. Therefore, we also reject hypothesis 3g.
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Table I.II: Personality and Adjustment
Pen Before Pen After Di↵erence
Openness
OP 0.288** 0.018 –0.316**
(0.127) (0.063) (0.127)
Interaction OP*Info –0.372* 0.168 0.580**
(0.215) (0.107) (0.263)
Info Treatment –0.187 –0.010 0.162
(0.245) (0.149) (0.258)
Agreeableness
AG 0.118 0.083 0.009
(0.158) (0.124) (0.159)
Interaction AG*Info –0.162 –0.154 –0.057
(0.252) (0.185) (0.327)
Info Treatment –0.235 0.017 0.255
(0.257) (0.195) (0.300)
Observations 201 248 201
Control treatment is reference category. Coe cients on public treatment not reported. Controlled for
variables with significant di↵erences and performance in IQ-quiz. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and
clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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II Additional Results
Figure II.I: Pre-Experimental Choices - Pens, Lip-Balms, and Folders
x
Table II.I: Descriptive Statistics across Survey Participation
Full Sample Online Survey No Survey Di↵erence
Male 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.05
Age 22.86 22.87 22.80  0.06
Education 3.36 3.36 3.35  0.00
Students 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.02
Semester 3.68 3.51 4.39 0.88
Student Job 0.28 0.26 0.33 0.07
Mthl. Income 688.36 692.70 669.86  22.84
Risk Preference 5.34 5.39 5.15  0.24
Lab Experience 1.89 1.87 1.96 0.09
Know Someone 0.31 0.34 0.20  0.14⇤
Persons in Session 11.33 11.26 11.61 0.35⇤⇤⇤
Correct Control Questions 4.74 4.76 4.67  0.09
Correct Quiz Questions 4.43 4.43 4.43 0.00
Financial Literacy 4.59 4.60 4.53  0.07
Cognitive Reflection 1.91 1.91 1.90  0.01
Conscientiousness  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.00
Neuroticism 0.03  0.01 0.20 0.21
Extraversion  0.02  0.03 0.01 0.04
Openess  0.02  0.00  0.11  0.11
Agreeableness  0.01 0.02  0.16  0.18
Self-Esteem  0.01 0.03  0.18  0.21
Locus of Control 0.00 0.05  0.21  0.26
Self-Monitoring  0.02  0.04 0.09 0.14
Observations 270 219 51 270
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table II.II: E↵ects on Loan Take-Up - Pre-Experiment Choice
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment –0.068 –0.006 –0.083 –0.021
(0.125) (0.088) (0.146) (0.094)
Info Treatment 0.078 0.030 0.036 –0.017
(0.135) (0.076) (0.133) (0.079)
Pen Before 0.084** 0.056*** 0.064* 0.039
(0.036) (0.021) (0.038) (0.025)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 219 219 201 201
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table II.III: E↵ects on Loan Take-Up, Info Treatment Correction - Pre-Experiment
Choice
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment –0.151 –0.165 0.031 0.180
(0.249) (0.109) (0.586) (0.476)
Order –0.016 –0.002
(0.022) (0.010)
Interaction Order*Info 0.030 0.024*
(0.027) (0.013)
Pen Before 0.067* 0.040 0.014 0.019
(0.038) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027)
Mean Prev. Pens 0.086 0.124
(0.137) (0.141)
Interaction Mean*Info –0.005 –0.067
(0.211) (0.175)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Correction Order Order Mean Pen Mean Pen
Observations 201 201 183 183
Control treatment is reference category. Coe cients on public treatment not reported. Controlled for
variables with significant di↵erences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table II.IV: Deviation from Pre-Experiment Choice - Dummy
Pre-Experiment = Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment –0.012 –0.051 0.198 0.216
(0.066) (0.075) (0.165) (0.195)
Info Treatment –0.020 –0.027 0.103 0.135
(0.080) (0.100) (0.170) (0.201)
Order 0.012 0.015
(0.015) (0.014)
Interaction Order*Info –0.020 –0.025
(0.023) (0.025)
Mean Control Group 0.312 0.312 0.312 0.312
Controls No Yes No Yes
Correction No No Order Order
Observations 219 201 219 201
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table II.V: Using a Di↵erent Ordering
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment 0.016 –0.161 0.094 0.138
(0.193) (0.113) (0.085) (0.103)
Order 2 0.004 –0.007 –0.004 –0.002
(0.021) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Interaction Order*Info 0.007 0.025* –0.003 –0.011
(0.029) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.038 0.043
Correction Order 2 Order 2 Order 2 Order 2
Observations 248 248 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Coe cients on public treatment not reported. Controlled for
variables with significant di↵erences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table II.VI: Decisions by Sex
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment –0.009 0.034 0.097* 0.071
(0.165) (0.133) (0.052) (0.047)
Info Treatment –0.009 –0.057 –0.002 0.010
(0.161) (0.121) (0.047) (0.051)
Male 0.066 –0.034 –0.060 –0.045
(0.108) (0.084) (0.039) (0.044)
Interaction Sex*Public –0.035 –0.055 0.039 0.010
(0.190) (0.141) (0.111) (0.078)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.038 0.043
Observations 247 247 247 247
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table II.VII: Number of Modes for Pens Bought
Number of Modes Number of Modes
Public Treatment –0.207 –0.191
(0.573) (0.580)
Info Treatment –0.415 –0.641
(0.431) (0.451)
Mean Control Group 1.903 1.903
Controls No Yes
Observations 270 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant di↵erences. SE in
parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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III Experimental material
Material III.I: Instructions
Instructions 
The experiment in which you are going to participate serves to analyze decision behavior. 
For your presence, you will receive an amount of 5 Euro, independent of your decisions and of 
other events in the experiment. The participation fee is 3.50 Euro. In addition, you can earn 
money in the experiment that depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the other 
participants. For that reason, it is very important that you read these instructions thoroughly. 
During the experiment it is not permitted to use electronic devices or to communicate with 
the other participants as long as you are not requested to do so. Please only use the 
programs and functions provided for this experiment. Please do not talk to the other 
participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to answer your 
question in private. Please do not ask your question out loud in any circumstance. In case 
the question is relevant for all participants, we will repeat it and answer it for everyone. 
If you violate the rules, you will be excluded from the experiment and the payment. 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will find short comprehension questions on the screen. 
Please answer these. If you answer one or more of these questions incorrectly, one of the 
experimenters will come to discuss open questions with you if necessary. 
Structure of the experiment: 
1. First option to obtain income - IQ test questions 
2. Information about your performance in the first revenue round 
3. Shopping round 
4. Second option to obtain income – Slider 
5. Questionnaire 
What happens during the first revenue round? 
You have to answer 12 questions during the first revenue round. These are questions that are 
also used to measure intelligence. The income in this round depends on your performance in 
relation to  the other participants. The three participants with the best results get 3 Euro, the 
second three get 2 Euro, the third three get 1 Euro and the last three get 0.50 Euro. This means, 
you are in a direct comparison with the other participants. In case of a tie, the speed with which 
the questions were answered decides over the ranking.   
You will learn see how you performed in comparison to the other participants directly after the 
IQ test questions. You alone will see your personal rank. 
What happens during the shopping round? 
After the IQ test questions, you will have the possibility to buy a pen. You can decide between 
five different pens. All pens are of different quality and have different prices. If your earned 
income is not sufficient, you will have the opportunity to take out a loan to buy a pen of better 
xv
quality. All pens are clearly labelled and the quality of the pens is obvious. Income not spend 
will expire. The taken credit will be subtracted from your participation fee of 3.50 Euro. You 
will receive the pen at the end of the experiment together with your payment. 
You will later see on the screen how you inform the experimenters about your decision. 
What happens during the second revenue round? 
In this round, you can earn additional income. Your income will depend solely on your own 
performance. You have to move sliders to a certain point. You will be paid for each slider that 
is moved to the right point. The income you will earn per slider will decrease with the amount 
of sliders you already set correctly: for the first set of eight correctly set sliders you earn more 
than for the second set of eight correctly set sliders, for the second set of eight correctly set 
sliders you earn more than for the third set of eight correctly set sliders etc.. You can keep the 
whole income you earned during this round. 
This round follows a questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, you will receive your payment 
and the pen you bought in the next room one after another. Please wait outside the room until 
we call your name as only one person at the same time should be inside the room to receive the 
payment.  
Schematic: 
Total remuneration =     Show-Up fee 5 Euro 
   + Participation fee 3.50 Euro 
   + Variable income 1 (IQ test: must be spent to purchase a pen or expires) 
   + Variable income 2 (Slider task: money can be kept) 
 
 
 
   
xvi
Material III.II: Comprehension Questions
Comprehension questions: 
1. On what does your income depend in the first revenue round? 
a. Only on my own performance 
b. On my own performance in relation to other participants 
c. Only on the performance of the others 
 
2. What happens to the income of the first round that you do not spend? 
a. I can keep it 
b. It expires 
c. The other participants get it 
 
3. On what does your income depend in the second revenue round? 
a. Only on my own performance 
b. On my own performance in relation to other participants 
c. Only on the performance of the others 
 
4. What are the options in case you want to buy a better pen than your income can actually 
pay for? 
a. Take out a loan 
b. Nothing 
c. Take money from other participants 
 
5. What happens if you cannot pay back the credit with the earned money? 
a. I can give back the pen 
b. I have to pay the money to the experimenters 
c. The money will be deducted from my participation revenue 
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